Recently, Pedersen and Mutz ( 2019)showed that preferences for an ideal level of economic equality are anchored by the perceived level of current economic inequality, a finding that helps explain why previous studies had found roughly similar preferences for ideal income inequality across the political spectrum. Scholars have found the anchoring heuristic to affect a wide range of judgments and decisions including, among others, responses to factual questions, probability estimates, forecasts, negotiations, and purchasing decisions (e.g., Ariely et al., 2003 Furnham & Boo, 2011 Klein et al., 2014). On average, participants treated with low numbers offered lower percentages than participants treated with high numbers. ![]() In their study, participants were shown a high or low number from a roulette wheel and then were asked to estimate the percentage of African countries that belonged to the United Nations. Tversky and Khaneman ( 1974) provide the earliest demonstration of the anchoring heuristic, a cognitive bias they labeled “anchoring and adjustment” because the initial value fixes the starting point and the answer given is an adjustment made from that starting point. The anchoring heuristic occurs when an initial value or number, often random or uninformative, biases responses toward the initial value or number. Moreover, when the anchor is an attempt to set the policy agenda with an opening gambit, one may reasonably worry that anchoring effects could be normatively undesirable since it provides elites with greater opportunity to manipulate public opinion. However, although we are fairly confident concluding that the public acts competently when disregarding politically meaningless numbers, we are not as confident concluding that an anchor rooted in the status quo is always a desirable outcome. For instance, it may be prudent to consider the status quo since alternatives far away from current policy are often politically unfeasible. Do our results offer evidence of a competent public? We think it might, at least if an anchor represents the status quo. We believe these results offer insight into the psychological foundations for why the status quo and agenda setting can have such a powerful influence on public opinion. Taken together, our results suggest that people are susceptible to anchoring effects when numbers matter-using politically relevant numbers to inform policy preferences-and that people are more likely to rely on policy relevant information rather than a partisan heuristic. So, while we believe that public opinion on abortion, at least in the US case, has traditionally been more firmly rooted in values or identities, there are important choices today where the anchor (status quo) plays a crucial role in shaping policy preferences. The reference point, or anchor, influences how people in these contexts perceive what a policy change/proposal means: 15 weeks would be the “pro-life” direction in the US and the “pro-choice” direction in France. In France, on the other hand, women have until 14 weeks to get an abortion “on demand.” In some US states moving from 24 to 15 weeks is a “loss in freedom,” or a conservative change while in France moving to 15 weeks would be an increase in freedom or a movement towards the left. ![]() Wade, women had about 24 weeks to receive an abortion “on demand.” Mississippi proposed to move this to 15 weeks. ![]() A recent example we did not examine is abortion policy. Rather, we find it to be an underappreciated phenomenon in politics since it can help explain why the status quo can be such a powerful influence. We are not of the mind that anchoring is important for all issues all the time, nor do we consider it a grand rhetorical strategy.
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